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EXICO is a developing nation that does not have the resources
to adequately support its population.' In an effort to acquire
wealth and support its population, Mexico joined Canada and
the United States in signing the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) on December 17, 1992.2 NAFTA aimed to accomplish three
main goals: (1) decrease trade distortions; (2) create productive business
environments within the member countries; and (3) establish mutually
beneficial trade relationships.3 To promote these goals, NAFTA required
Mexico to change its tax system from a protectionist policy, favoring do-
mestic companies, to a free-trade policy, favoring neither domestic nor
foreign companies. 4 Furthermore, the Agreement does recognize that
any tax treaty would supersede any tax issue addressed in a NAFTA pro-
vision.5 The purpose of this casenote is to identify changes in Mexican
tax law as a result of NAFTA and briefly discuss the effect of these
changes on the Mexican government.
II. MEXICO'S PREVIOUS TAX SYSTEM
Mexico's previous tax system protected domestic companies by creat-
ing disincentives for foreign companies. 6 This tax system was character-
ized by high tariffs, high withholding on repatriation of income, and no
tax treaties to prevent double taxation. 7 All three of these characteristics
acted as disincentives for foreign investors. The high tariffs required for-
* Associate, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld- Dallas, Texas
1. Poverty remains a significant problem with over half the country; approximately 50
million people are living in poverty. Furthermore, 40% of the population shares
only 11% of the wealth. News Release No. 2005/38[LAC, The World Bank, Mex-
ico Makes Progress and Faces Challenges in Poverty Reduction Efforts (July 28,
2004), available at http://web.worldbank.org/ (on file with author).
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, pmbl., 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
3. Mauricio Monroy, Harmonizing the Mexican Tax System With the Goals of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, 35 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 739, 740 (1998).
4. Id. at 741.
5. Article 2103 specifically states: "[e]xcept as set out in this Article, nothing in this
Agreement shall apply to taxation measures." NAFIA, supra note 2, Art. 2103.
6. Monroy, supra note 3, at 739.
7. Id.
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eign investors to pay the Mexican government upon entering with goods.8
Likewise, the high withholdings required foreign investors to pay the
Mexican government upon exiting the market with revenue. 9 Addition-
ally, in the absence of a treaty, foreign investors would have to pay taxes
in both their home country and Mexico. 10 Mexico's reformed tax system
consists of a significant number of tax treaties, which reduce double
taxation."
III. MEXICO'S CURRENT TAX SYSTEM
Mexico's current tax system consists of several bilateral treaties cou-
pled with transfer pricing legislation. 12 The main purposes of bilateral tax
treaties are to eliminate "income tax barriers to cross-border trade and
investment,' 3 and prevent tax evasion. 14 Countries can use existing tax
treaty models as a starting point.' 5 The Organization of Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD), the United Nations (UN), and the
United States all sponsor model tax treaties. 16 Mexico generally uses the
OECD and UN models in drafting its tax treaties.17
Bilateral tax treaties promote foreign investment, and transfer pricing
legislation ensures that the Mexican government taxes a proper propor-
tion of the foreign investment. Transfer pricing legislation accomplishes
this by imputing the fair value of goods and services sold between related
companies.
A. TAX TREATIES
Tax treaties eliminate tax barriers in cross-border transactions by
preventing double taxation.'8 Double taxation occurs when both Mexico
and the foreign national's home country tax the same income. 19 Mexico
signed twenty-five bilateral tax treaties from 1992 through 2004.20
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Letter from William Jefferson Clinton, Forty-Second President of the United
States of America, to the Senate of the United States (May 20, 1993) (filed with
the U.S.-Mex. Income Tax Convention).
11. Sergio Mario Ostos, Mexico Increase Its Web of Tax Treaties, A.B.A. SEc. INT'L L.
NEWS 17 (Fall 2004).
12. Philip D. Morrison, The U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty: Its Relation to NAFTA and Its
Status, 1 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 311, 311 (1993).
13. Id. at 312.
14. Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform
In Developing Countries, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 147 (2003).
15. Ostos, supra note 11, at 17. The models allow for efficient and effective negotia-
tion regarding the more sensitive matters by first establishing a basic framework.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Morrison, supra note 12, at 313.
19. Id.
20. Ostos, supra note 11, at 17. Mexico has also entered into thirty-two tax conven-
tions, and it is expected that Mexico will enter into another forty-four conventions
in the near future. An enacted tax convention has the same effect as a tax treaty.
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Generally, a tax treaty establishes that a country can tax foreigners on
income attributable to a "permanent establishment" in that country, and
the foreigner's home country can tax the same taxpayer on worldwide
income.2 1 In the absence of a treaty, the two countries could tax the same
income.22 The home country would tax their taxpayers on worldwide in-
come and the foreign country would tax a portion of that same income
based on the foreign country's tax law. This situation does not occur be-
tween Mexico and its twenty-five treaty partners because the treaties
along with domestic laws allocate revenue based on the source of the
income.23
While bilateral tax treaties generally attempt to eliminate double taxa-
tion, taxpayers in both the United States and Mexico should focus on the
peculiarities of the U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty (the Treaty). According to
the Mexican Constitution, international tax treaties do not have any ef-
fect on domestic activities unless the legislature passes a law.24 There-
fore, taxpayers should examine their situation from both a domestic and
international perspective and determine which perspective favors them
most.25 While this loophole gives taxpayers flexibility, it may result in the
Mexican government losing tax revenues. In some situations the domes-
tic law is more taxpayer friendly than the treaty.26 The Mexican govern-
ment will lose tax revenues from foreign corporations if they do not enact
legislation corresponding to the tax treaties it signs and international cor-
porations exercise their option to apply the more advantageous domestic
law.
27
A foreign tax credit allows American taxpayers to offset U.S. taxes,
dollar for dollar, with Mexican taxes paid on the same income. 28 "If the
U.S. tax is higher than the foreign tax, the [United States] collects" the
difference between the two tax calculations "but no more. '29 Generally,
the foreign tax credit promotes NAFTA's goal of eliminating trade barri-
ers by not requiring American taxpayers to pay two taxes on the same
income.
American taxpayers do not necessarily get a foreign tax credit for each
peso paid towards their Mexican tax liability. The Internal Revenue
Code does not allow foreign tax credits to exceed the taxpayers' taxes in
21. Stewart, supra note 14, at 147.
22. See Letter from William Jefferson Clinton to the Senate of the United States,
supra note 10.
23. Morrison, supra note 12, at 313. See also Ostos, supra note 11, at 18. Sergio Mario
Ostos suggests that Mexico can further avoid double taxation by "entering into
international tax treaties." International tax treaties serve the same function as
bilateral tax treaties but do so more efficiently by serving as an agreement between
more than two countries.
24. Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CoNsT.], Art. 15, 31(IV),
73 (III), Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], February 5, 1917 (Mex).
25. Monroy, supra note 3, at 747.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Morrison, supra note 12, at 313.
29. Id.
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the United States.30 Therefore, if an American taxpayer owes $500 in
taxes to the United States and paid the equivalent of $750 in Mexican
taxes, the taxpayer can only use $500 worth of foreign tax credits to offset
its tax liability in the United States.
Another peculiar characteristic of the Treaty is the treatment of cross-
border transportation revenue. Generally tax treaties permit the "coun-
try of residence" to tax profits from international operations of ships and
airplanes. 31 This type of arrangement allows airline and shipping compa-
nies to operate in many different countries without being financially and
administratively burdened by international taxes.32 The Treaty failed to
extend this preferential treatment to the trucking and railroad indus-
tries. 33 Therefore, trucking companies must keep track of their revenues
generated in the United States and Mexico.34 Trucking companies will
also face problems of inconsistent allocation.35 Inconsistent allocation
occurs when both countries claim taxing rights over the same income.
The lack of preferential treatment and inconsistent allocation of income
could decrease Mexico's tax base by deterring shipping companies from
operating in Mexico.
The Treaty also calls for a reduction in the Mexican royalty withholding
tax from 35 percent to 10 percent. 36 Before the Treaty, the tax rate on
films, literary copyrights, and drawings was 15 percent, and royalties were
taxed at a rate of 35 percent. 37 In comparison, the United States taxed all
royalties at a rate of 30 percent. 38
Royalties are "payments of any kind received as consideration for the
use of, or the right to use, any copyright of a literary, artistic, or scientific
work, including films, tapes or other means of reproduction for use in
30. Id.
31. Office of Economic Control and Development Model Double Taxation Conven-
tion on Income and Capital (1977), reprinted in C. VAN RAAD, MODEL INCOME
TAX TREATIES: A COMPARATIVE PRESENTATION OF THE TEXT OF THE MODEL
DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS OF INCOME AND CAPITAL OF THE OFFICE OF
THE ECONOMIC CONTROL AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE OECD (1963 AND 1977),
UNITED NATIONS (1980), AND UNITED STATES (1981) (Deventer, The Nether-
lands: Klewer) (1983).
32. Morrison, supra note 12, at 316.
33. Id. See also United States-Mexico Income Tax Convention, U.S.-Mex., Dec. 28,
1993, Sen. Treaty Doc. No. 103-7, Art. 8 (1994) [hereinafter Tax Convention].
34. Tax Convention, supra note 33.
35. Morrison, supra note 12, at 316.
36. Morrison, supra note 12, at 317.
37. Treasury Department Technical Explanation of the Convention and Protocol Be-
tween the Government of the United States and the Government of the United Mexi-
can States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Signed at Washington on September 19,
1992, Art. 12 3 (Treas. Dep't 1994) [hereinafter Technical Explanation]. Mexico
taxes entities based on the assets they hold at the end of each year. In an effort to
promote cross border transactions, the Mexican government has decided to allow
Mexican taxpayers to use the higher, non-treaty (U.S.) royalty tax rate to calculate
their foreign tax credit which is applied to offset the asset tax. In some cases, this
could completely eliminate the asset tax.
38. Id.
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connection with television. '39 One situation in which the royalty tax
withholding comes into play is when an American company allows a
Mexican company to use its trademark. As part of this agreement, the
Mexican company agrees to remit specified royalty payments to the Mex-
ican government on behalf of the American company. After the Treaty,
American companies retain 90 percent of their royalty income in compar-
ison to only retaining 65 percent before the Treaty. This makes the Mexi-
can market more appealing for American companies to contract with
potential Mexican companies. An influx of foreign capital would increase
Mexico's tax base; however, the substantial drop in tax rates could more
than offset the increased tax base.
B. TRANSFER PRICING LEGISLATION
Transfer pricing issues arise when related parties located in different
countries conduct business with each other.40 Related parties may dis-
count prices between each other to decrease their reported revenues and
their resulting tax burden. While this may help related companies, it de-
creases a taxing authority's ability to assess taxes.41 In an effort to com-
bat this problem, Mexico has enacted transfer pricing legislation.42 This
legislation allows the Mexican taxing authority (the Servicios de Adminis-
tracion Tributaria, or SAT) to adjust transfer prices between related par-
ties that are not conducted on an "arm's length basis."'43 The SAT
determines if a transaction is at "arm's length" by examining "compara-
ble operations. '44 Related parties do not conduct business on an "arm's
length basis" when there is a significant difference in price, consideration,
and profit margin between the related parties and "comparable opera-
tions."45 Taxpayers can appeal a transfer pricing adjustment; however, if
they are unsuccessful, the SAT can impose additional penalties. 46
The maquiladoras were the first group of taxpayers affected by the
transfer pricing legislation. The maquiladoras are concentrated in the
northern part of Mexico along the United States border, and they pay
39. Id. at 5.
40. Monroy, supra note 3, at 758. The term "related parties" refers to a situation when
one party "directly or indirectly participates in the administration, control, or capi-
tal of the other, or when a person or group of persons directly or indirectly partici-
pates in the administration, control or capital of said parties."
41. Id. at 752. Related companies benefit by reducing the transfer price on a transac-
tion because the seller recognizes less gross income on such a sale. Less gross
income results in less taxable income and a smaller amount of tax due. A smaller
amount of tax due is a positive result for taxpayers but a negative result for the
SAT. Therefore, the Mexican government passed legislation to recapture this lost
tax revenue by imputing a fair price (based on an arm's length transaction) on the
sale of goods or services between related parties.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 754.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 758.
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their workers between $3.50 and $5.00 per day.47 Some commentators
describe the maquiladoras as a "manifestation of the global sweatshop. '48
Nonetheless, American companies have established maquiladora facto-
ries in Mexico. These factories produce the goods and sell them back to
their American counterpart. The SAT then makes any adjustments it
deems necessary. However, the SAT allows maquiladoras to avoid trans-
fer tax adjustments by reporting taxable income that is at least 5 percent
of factories' asset value.49
IV. NO INCREASE IN TAX REVENUE
Despite an increase in foreign direct investment and signing twenty-
five tax treaties, Mexico has not been able to increase its tax revenue. 50
One could even argue that tax revenues decreased between 1980 and
1997.51 Some commentators attribute Mexico's inability to increase tax
revenue to a downward trend in foreign direct investment and an ineffec-
tive tax administration.52
A. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
While foreign direct investment may have increased in Mexico, Mex-
ico's gross domestic product per person has stayed relatively constant
over the past twenty years.53 Foreign direct investment occurs when an
entity seeks to obtain a lasting interest in a foreign enterprise. 54 Lasting
interest "implies the existence of a long-term relationship" between the
47. Jen Soriano, Globalization and the Maquiladoras, MOTHER JONES, Nov. 24, 1999,
at http://www.motherjones.com/news/special-reports/wto/sorianol.html.
48. Id. Jen Soriano quoted Larry Weiss, labor and globalization program director at
the Resource Center of the Americas, regarding the characterization of the maqui-
ladoras as sweatshops.
49. Monroy, supra note 3, at 759.
50. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Mexico: An Evaluation of the Main Features of the Tax
System, 43 GA. ST. U. ANDREW YOUNG SCH. OF POL'Y STUD 43 (Ga. St. U. An-
drew Young Sch. of Pol'y Stud., Working Paper 01-12, Nov. 2001), available at
http://isp-aysps.gsu.edu/papers/ispwp0112.html [hereinafter Martinez-Vazquez,
Mexico].
51. Id. Solid support for a decrease in tax revenues from 1980 to 1997 rests in the fact
that government revenues as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in-
creased by approximately half of a percentage point while taxes on domestic and
international goods each dropped half a percentage point. The non-tax revenue,
which includes revenue from the sale of oil, accounts for the total increase in gov-
ernment revenues.
52. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Duanjie Chen, The Impact of NAFTA and Options
for Tax Reform in Mexico 8 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series,
Working Paper 01-2) Jan. 2001) [hereinafter Martinez-Vazquez, Impact of
NAFTA].
53. Erwan Quintin, Is Mexico Ready to Roar?, Sw. ECON. (Federal Reserve Bank,
Dallas, Tex.), Sept./Oct. 2002, at 1, 2, available at http://www.dallasfed.org/re-
search/swe/ 2002/sweO2O5a.html.
54. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Benchmark
Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 3d Edition (1999), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/16/2090148.pdf. Generally, Mexico's total tax base, the
amount subject to taxation, increases as foreign direct investment increases.
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investor and the foreign enterprise. 55 Additionally investors should have
a "significant degree of influence on the management of the enter-
prise."' 56 The Mexican government generally considers an increase in for-
eign direct investment a positive trend because it correlates to an
increased tax base. Furthermore, an increased tax base should result in
additional tax revenue.
The drop in foreign direct investment can be attributed, in part, to the
restrictive legal environment.57 For example, several large global compa-
nies decided not to bid on $8 billion of contracts to explore natural gas
fields because Mexican regulatory laws prevent companies from making a
profit on the sale of natural gas.58 Mexico's foreign direct investment
decreased from $14.4 billion dollars in 2002 to $10.7 billion dollars in
2003, which is a 26 percent drop.59 Despite this decrease, Mexico remains
the largest economy in Latin America.60
Recently, foreign entities began sending capital, in the form of jobs, to
countries other than Mexico.61 China is a prime example. Mexico is also
losing foreign investment dollars to China because labor in China is
cheaper than Mexican labor. Tim Kearney, of Bear Stearns, suggests that
more countries will start investing in Mexico due to its proximity with the
United States.62 Kearney's suggestion assumes that Mexico will be able
to ride America's coattails to economic prosperity. Instead of depending
on the United States, Mexico should consider relaxing their energy laws
and educating their citizens for non-manufacturing jobs.
B. INEFFECTIVE TAX ADMINISTRATION
Mexico cannot afford to fight poverty, relax their energy regulations,
or spend additional money on educating their citizens, in part, because of
its ineffective tax administration. 63 Mexico ranks among the world's most
inefficient countries when it comes to tax efficiency.64 Tax efficiency re-
flects the taxing authority's ability to collect assessed taxes. 65 Specifically,
Mexico ranks below Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Costa Rica in tax effi-
ciency.66 Approximately fifteen million tax evaders, half the total taxpay-
55. Id.
56. Id. at 7-8.
57. Thomas Black, Mexico's 2003 Foreign Direct Investment Drops 26%, BLOOM-







63. The Mexican government needs additional revenue from taxes in order to increase
the money spent on social and welfare issues including fighting poverty, educating
the citizens, and fixing the roads.
64. Martinez-Vazquez, Mexico, supra note 50.
65. Martinez-Vazquez, Impact of NAFTA, supra note 52, at 7.
66. Id. at 7.
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ers, significantly contribute to Mexico's inefficient tax administration. 67
Most of these tax evaders work in the maquiladoras and make very little
money. Consequently, Mexico is losing out on tax revenue equal to 1
percent of its gross domestic product. 68 Collecting this revenue should
remain a top priority to combat Mexico's culture of tax evasion.69 In or-
der to combat this culture, Mexico must change its tax structure and im-
plement new tracking methods.
Mexico has taken a huge step towards overhauling its tax administra-
tion by entering into an agreement with PeopleSoft. 70 On July 19, 2004,
the SAT agreed to a $50 million, two-year deal with PeopleSoft.71 Cur-
rently the SAT's tax system includes sixty-six databases disbursed across
the country. 72 PeopleSoft plans on modernizing and integrating Mexico's
tax system.73 Upon completion of this project, taxpayers will have im-
proved access to information regarding the tax laws, and the SAT will
benefit from more effective methods which control payments and reduce
tax evasion.74
V. CONCLUSION
With the signing of NAFTA, Mexico announced that it was opening its
borders to foreign investors. While foreign companies have established
thousands of jobs, the Mexican government has been unable increase its
tax revenues. Furthermore, Mexico has not been able to sufficiently fight
its poverty problem due to its inability to efficiently collect tax revenues.
Even though Mexico has signed NAFTA, signed approximately twenty-
five tax treaties, and opened its borders to the world, it will not be able to
truly fight poverty until its tax administration operates more efficiently.





70. Press Release, PeopleSoft, PeopleSoft Awarded Largest Deal in Company History
(July 24, 2004) (on file with author).
71. Id.
72. Renee Boucher Ferguson, PeopleSoft to Revamp Mexico's Tax System,
EWEEK.CoM, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1632248,00.asp.
73. Id.
74. Id.
